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CIVIL COMMITMENT-DUE PROCESS
AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF
John Ballay appeared at the Capitol in Washington, D.C., on January
19, 1971, contending to be the United States Senator from Illinois. Later,
on June 7 and June 29, 1971, he attempted to enter the White House
claiming that he was not only a United States Senator but that he was
also the husband of the President's daughter. Following each visit he
was taken to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, a public mental health facility in
Washington. The procedures followed to effect Ballay's involuntary com-
mitment after the June 29th incident were examined by the United States
Court of Appeals for .the District of Columbia in In re Ballay.1 After
being brought to the facility by a Secret Service agent, Ballay was exam-
ined by a psychiatrist and a request for his continued hospitalization was
made to the district court as required ,by statute. 2 The order was issued
on June 30, 1971, authorizing the hospital to hold Ballay for an addi-
tional seven days. He was actually held for nearly one month pursuant
to another section of the statute3 until an administrative hearing was held
before the Commission on Mental Health. The Commission recom-
mended that Ballay be committed and their finding was sent to the dis-
trict court. A jury trial was demanded by Ballay and, when the jury
agreed with the Commission's findings, Ballay was committed. 4
The appeal from the jury's finding was based on an alleged constitu-
tional defect in the instructions given to the jury. The jury had been
instructed that if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that Ballay
was "mentally ill and, because of that illness, [was] likely to injure him-
self or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty . . ." then it should
order his commitment. On appeal, Ballay claimed that the standard of
proof enunciated in the instructions, that is, a preponderance of the evi-
dence, is constitutionally insufficient for the purpose of depriving a person
of his or her liberty. He contended that due process requires the applica-
tion of the criminal evidentiary standard, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, before an involuntary commitment is constitutional.
1. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-523 (1973).
3. Id. § 21-528.
4. id. § 21-545.
5. Id. § 21-545(b).
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The court of appeals declared that it is necessary to apply the more
stringent standard of proof to mental health commitment as a requirement
of procedural due process. In rendering such a decision, the court found
the protected interest in mental health commitment similar to that found by
the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault,6 a case involving juvenile
delinquency proceedings, and in Morrissey v. Brewer7 concerning parole
violation hearings. These cases held that due process must be given to
those persons within the class in question who stood to lose their liberty
even though the proceedings involved did not constitute criminal trials.
The application of this principle to the mental health commitment proc-
ess by the court of appeals in Ballay has significance for both mental
health commitment and constitutional law. When applied in commitment
proceedings, the standard adopted in Ballay would require the committing
authority to prove with much more certainty that commitment is neces-
sary. The decision also signals an extension of the due process clause
to another class of persons whose rights have traditionally been given in-
adequate protection by the judiciary. After briefly discussing the devel-
opment of modem mental health commitment, this Note will, explore the
reasoning of the Ballay court and, in conclusion, will attempt to show why
the standard of proof adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit repre-
sents a positive step toward improving the lot of the patient in the com-
mitment process.
To understand the framework within which the modern mental health
commitment system operates, it is necessary to examine the doctrine of
parens patriae.8 It has long been recognized that persons suffering from
mental illnesses or defects would occasionally invite the intervention of
the state into their lives either because of anti-social behavior or an in-
ability to care for themselves.9 Since the conduct could be attributed to
the alleged infirmity and was often not of a criminal nature or only in-
6. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
8. 482 F.2d at 650. See also R. RocK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 7-8 (1968) [hereinafter cited as RocK]; T. SzAsz, LAw, LimBRTY
AND PSYCHIATRY 151-53 (1963). Not all commitments are based solely on the doc-
trine of parens patriae. Commitments effected under sexual psychopath statutes, the
detention of those incompetent to stand trial or the commitment of those who have
been found likely to be dangerous to others may be justified in part by the state's
police power. See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and
Policy, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 945, 955-56 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Ross]. However,
since the standards of civil commitment generally apply to proceedings commenced
under these circumstances, they may also be included within the scope of this note.
9. See, e.g., Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603); 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *303-07.
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volved a minor criminal offense, it seemed inappropriate for the state
to invoke the full force of the police power against the ill person. How-
ever, disruption of the community or family and the concern for the
well-being of the individual did require some official action and to answer
this need the doctrine of parens patriae was formulated.' 0 The classes
most often subject to this form of the state's power include juveniles, the
mentally ill and those who are mentally or physically incompetent to man-
age their own affairs."
Since the latter years of the nineteenth century, the state legislatures,
which have the primary responsibility for establishing the standards and
procedures for mental health commitment in the United States, 12 have
been aware of the need to protect the party subject to commitment from
the arbitrary action of the courts or from "railroading" by relatives or
others.' 3 The jury was initially seen as the panacea needed and until
recently, the use of the jury was mandatory in some states.' 4 Experience
has shown that the jury alone would not prevent abuses, so other s-tatu-
10. Some authors have contended that the motives for the formulation of the
doctrine are less than humanitarian and that it was designed to serve as an undemo-
cratic method of social control. See R. LEIFER, IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH
83-84 (1969) [hereinafter cited as LEIFER]. Modem judicial cynicism in the same
vein is found in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1967).
11. See Prerogative Regis, 17 Edw. 2, c. 9 & 10 (1324); An Act for the Better
Care and Maintenance of Lunatics, being Paupers or Criminals in England, 48
Geo. 3, c. 96, § 19 (1808). For an excellent summary of the historical develop-
ment of mental health commitment see S. BPAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DIs-
ABLED AND THE LAW 1-14 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BRAKEL & ROCK].
Mental illness can be distinguished from mental incompetence by noting that incom-
petence is generally a legal determination that the party is unable to conduct his
own affairs and is in need of a guardian or conservator. A person may be men-
tally ill without being incompetent even where that person has been civilly com-
mitted. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 9-11 (1973); Ross, supra note 8, at
949-50.
12. The courts have in recent years begun to take a more active role by provid-
ing detailed requirements for commitment where the legislative action has been in-
complete or constitutionally inadequate. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). See
also Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) where the court man-
dated extensive changes in the operation of the state mental hospital system.
13. Thomas Szasz, a psychiatrist and prolific writer on the relationship of law
and psychiatry including involuntary commitment, has contended throughout his
writings that commitment as we know it is antithetical to our basic legal heritage
and should be abolished altogether: "I believe that, like slavery, the entire oppres-
sive-coercive pattern inherent in present-day involuntary mental hospitalization is an
evil which must be done away with." T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 56
(1971). His thesis is fully explained at id., 57-71.
14. Kentucky was the last state to repeal its mandatory jury provision when it
did so in 1968. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 11, at 53-54.
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tory protections were developed. Today an enlightened state mental health
commitment statute includes some or all of the following provisions:
notice to the alleged ill person, the right to counsel, the right to a jury,
the right to present and cross-examine witnesses and the right to ap-
peal.15 In spite of the awareness and concern of some legislatures for
the rights of the alleged ill person, the nature of -the hearing has always
been perceived as essentially civil in nature with a standard of proof iden-
tical to that required in a tort or contract action-the party seeking com-
mitment, the state, need only establish its case by a preponderance of
the evidence---even though the verdict of the judge or jury could result
in the loss of the patient's liberty as though he or she had been a con-
victed defendant in a criminal trial.
Just as the legislatures have never seen fit to include a stricter standard
of proof in the statutes, the courts have preferred to rely on such charac-
terizations of the proceedings as "civil" or "special chancery proceed-
ings"'16 in reaching decisions concerning the standard of proof to be ap-
plied. By applying these labels in their commonly accepted form, the
courts have stated that only a preponderance of the evidence17 is needed
to commit a person, or have held only that the evidence be "clear and
convincing."' 8  While the language of some decisions indicates that the
judge was perhaps uneasy about -the preponderance standard, few courts
were willing to acknowledge the need to protect the patient's interests by
requiring the stricter reasonable doubt standard, and none were so willing
before 1945. Even though no state statute requires that a determination
of the need for commitment be made "beyond a reasonable doubt," four
other courts prior to In re Ballay recognized with varying emphasis that
the more stringent standard should be applied in mental health commit-
15. See B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS, 93-282 (1973)
for a summary of all state statutes. The authors indicate that forty states require
notice to the patient at some stage in the proceedings and that thirty-seven allow
or guarantee counsel for the patient. Only eleven states will offer a jury trial if
requested. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 10, at 66-132 offers charts which may not
be fully current but which are useful as they provide citations to specific sections
of the various statutes. A liberal model statute is proposed in Elliott, Procedures
for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO.
L. REV. 231, 269 (1970).
16. People v. Janssen, 263 Il. App. 101, 103 (1931).
17. See, e.g., In re Alexander, 372 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Dixon v.
Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); People v. English, 31 l.
2d 301, 304, 201 N.E.2d 455, 457-58 (1964); Myers Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 150 A.2d
525 (1959); Thompson v. Moore, 227 S.C. 417, 88 S.E.2d 354 (1955).
18. Titcomb v. Vantyle, 84 Ill. 371, 373 (1877); Dorchester v. Dorchester, 3
N.Y.S. 238 (1888), rev'd on other grounds, 121 N.Y. 156, 23 N.E. 1043 (1890).
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ment hearings. 19 The Ballay decision is the most emphatic and specific
statement concerning the issue of standard of proof to date and is the
only decision where the standard is the central issue.20  If the reasoning
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia were to be accepted
by other courts and state legislatures, it would further reduce the proce-
dural arbitrariness of the parens patriae doctrine while leaving the state
room to exercise its proper humanitarian concerns.
To understand the reasoning of Ballay, it is necessary to examine the
recent willingness of the Supreme Court to sweep aside the inequities
caused by the blind adherence to legal labels. Just as the Court has
blurred the distinction between "rights" and "privileges" vis-h-vis govern-
mental activities affecting the individual, 21 there has also been a con-
certed effort by the Court to look beyond the "civil" and "criminal" labels
which have obscured the substance of judicial action, 22 particularly where
the parens patriae doctrine has been applied. Instead of being content
to allow the label to determine the degree of due process to be accorded
a party, the Court has begun to examine the potential result of judicial
action before determining what procedural protections are due. This con-
cept was initially formulated in Speiser v. Randall:2'
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact-
finding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at
stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty
-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the
other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first
instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of pro-
ducing the evidence and convincing the factfinder of his guilt.24
19. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Pickles, 170
So. 2d 603 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1964); Ex parte Perry, 137 N.J. Eq. 161, 43 A.2d 885 (1945). See also
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 358-65 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1165-66 (4th Cir. 1971) (So-
beloff, J., concurring and dissenting).
20. This is also the first federal court of appeals to consider this question. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has made other decisions affecting
mental health commitment which are regarded as landmarks. See Covington v.
Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
22. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966).
23. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
24. Id. at 525-26 (footnote omitted).
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This basic philosophy has been given substance by the Court in a line
of cases headed by In re Gault25 and these cases were in turn cited by
the Ballay court to support the decision.
In Gault, the Court extended the protection of the Constitution to juve-
niles, because, in spite of the admirable motives of the state in providing
special juvenile courts, the actual effect of an adverse judgment in juve-
nile court proceedings was often deprivation of liberty whether or not
criminal conduct was involved. 26 The Court looked to the potential result
of an adverse judgment before determining what procedures were re-
quired, and it held that safeguards such as notice, 27 the right to an attor-
ney,28 the right to confront and cross examine witnesses, 29 and the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination 0 were required in juve-
nile court proceedings. In addition, the Court found that the state need
not be entirely deprived of its special concern for juveniles. Rather, it
held only that the exercise of the state's power must be tempered by the
recognition that juveniles also enjoy certain basic Constitutional rights.
The same template of reasoning has been applied to other forms of
state power, and through these other cases the Court has formulated a
guideline to be applied. Simply stated, the Court held in Morrissey v.
Brewer3' that when a state acts against an individual, that action must
satisfy a two-pronged test: First, does the state action require due proc-
ess for that action to be lawful, and second, if due process is required,
what specific safeguards are due? The court in Ballay used the Morris-
sey guideline to provide the framework for its decision,, The controversy
in Morrissey concerned the state's power over alleged parole violators.
The Supreme Court found that in determining whether an alleged violator
should be returned to prison, the state was acting parens patriae.32  As
in other situations where the state action came under this heading, the
actual administration of the power was typically arbitrary and perfunc-
25. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. Where criminal conduct is involved, the term of years spent in a state insti-
tution often exceeds the time spent in prison by an adult found guilty of the same
conduct. 387 U.S. at 27.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 41.
29. Id. at 56.
30. Id. at 55.
31. 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
32. Id. at 475. In light of the Court's almost bitter denunciation of the doctrine
in In re Gault, the use of the parens patriae label here foreshadowed the eventual
holding in favor of the parolees.
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tory. 8  The Court found that while the parolee did not stand to lose the
degree of liberty that a non-convict might lose,34 he did have an interest
to protect that required a commensurate degree of due process in order
to deprive him of that liberty.8 5
The court of appeals in Ballay recognized the need for a review of
the constitutional rights of the alleged mentally ill and used the Gault
and Morrissey decisions to provide the framework for its holding. The
court first found that a person committed under a court determination
of mental illness suffered not only an immediate loss of liberty but also
other effects ranging from deprivation of civil rights36 to the imposition
of the social stigma generally associated with mental illness and commit-
ment.87  Accordingly, in answering the first prong of the Morrissey test,
it was deemed necessary by the court of appeals to afford due process
to the party alleged to be in need of commitment.
The second inquiry required by the Morrissey test-what protections
are necessary-was met by adopting the Supreme Court's reasoning in
In re Winship,38 holding that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
of proof must be used to convict a juvenile accused of conduct which
would be criminal if ascribed to an adult. The analogy was clear to the
Ballay court: "[T]he loss of liberty-the interest of 'transcending value'
-is obviously as great for those civilly committed as for the criminal or
juvenile delinquent. '89 The alleged criminal has long had the benefit of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" formulation, and in Winship, the accused
juvenile also gained this procedural protection. It was but a short step
for the Ballay court to conclude "that the forcefully committed civil pa-
33. Id. at 476. The arbitrary and, especially, the perfunctory nature of commit-
ment proceedings has been noted by many authors. ROCK, supra note 8, at 121-
211; Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L.
REV. 383, 386-89 (1962); B. ENNIS, PISONERS OF PSYCMATRY, 77 (1972).
34. 408 U.S. at 482. A parolee in accepting parole is subject to restrictions not
only on his civil rights, but also on the more personal choices such as marriage
or changing jobs usually available to a citizen.
35. Id. at 489.
36. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 11, at 315-21 (personal and property rights),
322-25 (wills), 326-32 (occupations and licensing) and 333-40 (rights of citizen-
ship) for statutory provisions in the various states.
37. 482 F.2d at 651-52. See also GOFFMAN, Normal Deviants, in MENTAL
ILLNESS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 267 (T. Scheff ed. 1967).
38. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39. 482 F.2d at 668. The analogy apparently will not hold for all elements of
procedural due process. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (juveniles
not entitled to jury as matter of right in hearing concerning alleged criminal activ-
ity).
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tient has at stake interests of equivalent proportions" 40 to those of the
criminal or juvenile.
The change in the standard of proof required for mental health com-
mitment can prevent the routine commitment of those persons brought
before the courts who may not fit the typical statutory prescription of be-
ing dangerous to themselves or to others. 41  These persons may have a
condition which can be diagnosed and classified by the psychiatric exam-
iners, and because of the label attached by the doctor, they are commit-
ted. Even where the psychiatrist moves beyond the technical diagnosis
and attempts to show that the patient is indeed dangerous to himself or
others, such testimony can only be a prediction of the future conduct
of the patient. Predictions of human behavior are by their very nature
imprecise and uncertain4 2; for these predictions to be accepted by the com-
mitting authority, they should be as reliable as possible. 43 It is the inher-
ent imprecision in such predictions which should make it necessary to
establish their probability of occurring beyond a reasonable doubt be-
fore the patient's liberty would be removed. 44  Undoubtedly, many per-
40. 482 F.2d at 669.
41. For a discussion of the common statutory formulations see N. KITrE, THE
RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 65-75 (1971). Some states add the provision that such
persons found to be dangerous to themselves or others also require that the person
be "in need of treatment."
42. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CuM. L. BULL. 101, 111
(1971):
A diagnosis of mental illness tells us nothing about whether the person so
diagnosed is or is not dangerous. Some mental patients are dangerous,
some are not. Perhaps the psychiatrist is an expert at deciding whether
a person is mentally ill, but is he an expert at predicting which of the
persons so diagnosed are dangerous? Sane people, too, are dangerous and
it may legitimately be inquired whether there is anything in the education,
training or experience of psychiatrists which renders them particularly
adept at predicting dangerous behavior.
See also Comment, Due Process For All-Constitutional Standards For Involuntary
Commitment and Release, 34 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 633, 656 (1967).
43. The accepted standard is evidence of recent incidents of violence. Minne-
sota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). The Court stated:
"These underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past conduct pointing to prob-
able consequences are as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly ap-
plied in prosecutions for crime." Id. at 274.
44. In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), the Court ordered that all per-
sons detained in New York institutions for the criminally insane beyond their sen-
tences must be given hearings under the civil commitment statute rather than having
their detention continue as a routine matter where continued treatment appeared to
be indicated. The 969 persons comprising the so-called "Baxstrom population" have
provided insights into many problems concerning commitment including the issue of
future dangerousness. Once transferred to civil institutions only seven of the 969
proved to be too dangerous to be retained in those institutions. Only a single arrest,
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sons for whom commitment is sought would benefit from some form of
treatment, but an involuntary commitment may not be the best method
of providing that treatment. 45  The adoption of the "reasonable doubt
standard" would focus the commitment hearing on the legal question
-should the individual be deprived of his liberty because he is, as a re-
sult of mental illness, a danger to himself or others-rather than on the
strictly medical determination of a psychiatric label describing the individ-
ual's mental state. 46 The "reasonable doubt standard" is especially appro-
priate when treatment could 'be best obtained without commitment.4 7
Adoption of the stricter standard of proof would also help eliminate
the almost exclusive reliance on the testimony of medical personnel by
for petit larceny occurred among the 147 patients released out-right into the com-
munity within the first year after the Court ordered transfer. Hunt & Wiley, Opera-
tion Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 974, 976 (1968). The au-
thors, a doctor and lawyer employed by the New York State Department of Mental
Hygiene during the transfer period, conclude:
Most of them had been examined at least once-often several times-by
experienced psychiatrists from the Department of Mental Hygiene and had
been denied transfer on the grounds that they were too disturbed or poten-
tially dangerous. Yet over 99 per cent of them did well in civil hospitals
when the court decision compelled the move. This would appear to be an-
other instance of institutionalized expectations putting blinders on our per-
ceptions.
Id. at 977.
45. In Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969) the court held that
a patient must obtain treatment following commitment in the least restrictive setting.
Some state statutes also require the committing judge to explore alternative means
of treatment. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 9-6 (1973). Reasons for not
relying on the massive state institutions for adequate treatment are documented in
the "right to treatment" cases which held that a patient must be given treatment
following commitment and not merely be given custodial care. Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971).
46. After a point it may seem that discussion about the difference between the
standards of proof and the probable consequences and advantages of adopting one
over the other one can only lead to confusion and obscurity of what many consider
to be the "real" issue-if the potential committee is ill, he must be given treatment.
However, as Judge Sobeloff stated in his dissent to the decision in Tippett v. Mary-
land, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring and dissenting
"[t]he standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise; it reflects the
value society places on individual liberty." Judge Sobeloff does feel, however, that
all issues presented at a commitment hearing are not susceptible to determination
beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., clear and convincing evidence only is needed to
show future dangerousness. Id. at 1166. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has
stated, "it [the reasonable doubt standard] impresses on the trier of fact the neces-
sity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue." In re Winship,
397 U.S. at 364.
47. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron,
364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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the courts. This undue reliance on the expert's testimony has resulted
in "rubber-stamping" the doctor's opinion that the individual suffers
from one or more mental illnesses or conditions which require treatment
under the force of involuntary commitment. 4I Again, the accuracy of the
diagnosis is not the central issue but, rather, whether the diagnosed condi-
tion, or degree of condition, justifies the imposition of commitment. By
imposing the reasonable doubt standard, a court will be unable to com-
mit a person unless the state can provide something more than a one sen-
tence diagnosis of the individual's condition.49 When properly applied,
the new standard would require better preparation by both the doctor and
the state to support a recommendation of commitment. The adversary
character of the hearing, which is now generally lacking,50 could then be
restored with the patient's attorney challenging the state and its witness
to produce sufficient evidence.5 1 On those occasions when the state could
48. At least one psychiatrist also objects to this "rubber-stamp" relationship be-
tween law and psychiatry in the civil commitment process. Suarez, Psychiatry and
the Criminal Law System, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 293, 295 (1972).
49. In an American Bar Foundation study published in 1968 which focused on
four cities, Los Angeles, Chicago, Topeka and Philadelphia, it was found that cur-
sory evaluations and extremely short judicial hearings were the norm in most cases.
ROCK, supra note 8; at 121-213.
50. "Advocacy is by default allotted to the hospital psychiatrists with the lawyer
assuming only a 'ceremonial function.'" Comment, The New Mental Health
Codes: Safeguards in Compulsory Commitment and Release, 61 Nw. L. REV. 977,
981 (1967). See also Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExAs L. REv. 424, 424-25 (1966).
51. Objections by a doctor to the dominant presence of the psychiatrist at the
commitment hearing are vividly stated in LEIFER, supra note 10, at 123-125:
ITihe accused mental patient must defend himself against psychiatric testi-
mony that he is mentally ill, potentially dangerous, and in need of care
and treatment. This testimony is presented in vague, pseudoscientific lan-
guage so flexible that it may be used against anyone. Nor is the commit-
ment hearing an adversary procedure. The psychiatrists who testify
against the allegedly ill person are employed by the state, which is a party
to the decision. Yet, these psychiatrists are considered to be "neutral" ex-
perts. This is comparable to having the prosecuting attorney in a criminal
trial testify as an expert against the defendant! Moreover, the "mentally
ill" defendant may engage a psychiatrist to testify in his behalf only if he
has the funds, which often he does not have.
The information presented by the psychiatric "expert witness" in his
testimony against the patient-defendant is obtained from that patient dur-
ing the course of what is supposed to be a confidential doctor-patient rela-
tionship. Thus, the defendant in a commitment hearing is not protected
from testifying against himself. On the contrary, during interviews with
the hospital psychiatrist, the defendant supplies the bulk of the evidence
against himself. Refusal to cooperate with the psychiatrist, rather than be-
ing within his rights under the Fifth Amendment, may be construed as evi-
dence for a "paranoid illness" for which he requires psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion.
1974] 1509
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not establish the need for commitment beyond a reasonable doubt, the
patient would rightfully be freed where as once he might have been hospi-
talized for an indeterminate period of time. 52
While some courts have recognized that reform in the mental health
commitment procedures are necessary, it is doubtful that widespread
change will occur without a Supreme Court decision mandating such
changes. The dictum in a recent case indicates that the Supreme Court
would consider the litigation of the constitutional issues involved in com-
mitment as appropriate for determination: "Considering the number of
persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitu-
tional limitations on this power have not been more frequently liti-
gated."'53 This fact, coupled with the Court's previous objection to treat-
ing an illness as a crime,5 4 may indicate that a statement on this issue
by the Court may be forthcoming at some future date. A search for the
case within which it would be possible to determine these issues is ap-
parently being conducted. In Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court55
the Court heard the oral arguments and then decided that "this case does
not present these issues in a manner that warrants the certiorari jurisdic-
tion of this Court."5 6 More recently, the Court vacated57 the judgment
entered by the district court in Lessard v. Schmidt58 which had broadly
52. As was stated previously, some patients who are inappropriate for commit-
ment may nonetheless profit from some form of treatment. Even the liberal model
statute proposed in Elliott, supra note 15, would allow involuntary commitment for
those in need of treatment who refuse to cooperate even though they may not fall
under the "dangerous to self or others" provision.
53. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
54. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962): "It is unlikely that any
State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a criminal offense for
a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease."
55. 407 U.S. 355 (1972), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted to Tippett
v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971). Four inmates serving fixed prison
terms but committed under the Maryland defective delinquency statute petitioned the
Court for a review of that statute and the civil commitment statute. The Court
dismissed their petition as one of the inmates had been released and the rest would
be subject to continued incarceration because of the criminal convictions even if the
Court overturned the statutes in question. Further a contemplated revision of the
statutes by the state legislature made the Court wary of a "comprehensive challenge
to the Defective Delinquency Law" which might unduly interfere with the legislative
efforts. Id. at 357-58.
56. Id. at 357.
57. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
58. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Lessard v. Schmidt, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1276 (1974). Discussions
of mental health commitment in Illinois can be found in I. Beis, Civil Commitment:
Rights of the Mentally Disabled, Recent Developments and Trends, 23 DEPAUL L.
REv. 42 (1973) and R. Shlensky, Constitutional Problems with Mental Commitment
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attacked the Wisconsin commitment statute. By not reversing the judg-
ment in Lessard, the Court demonstrated that it is still open for considera-
tion of the proper case. When such a case is found, it can be hoped
that the Court will see fit to extend reforms such as that ordered in Ballay
to protect all persons who may be required to defend themselves at a
commitment hearing regardless of the jurisdiction. 59
David J. Brent
in Illinois, 62 ILL. B.J. 552 (1974). A comprehensive discussion of the current state
of commitment is found at Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HAv. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
59. The difficulty in making such changes in the appellate process was illus-
trated in Smith v. Staunton, 72 C 1979 (N.D. Ill. order entered Nov. 13, 1973)
where the attorneys for the plaintiff-patients in pre-trial conference agreed to drop
their demand for the requiring of the reasonable doubt standard since the judge,
sitting without a jury, had ordered the commitment of patients Smith and Mathew,
and there was no means of determining what standard he applied in reaching that
decision. Due to this uncertainty, no appeal was possible on this issue.

